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Organizational monitoring relies frequently on self-reports (e.g., work hours, progress
reports, travel expenses). A “one-by-one” policy requires employees to submit a series
of reports (e.g., daily or itemized reports). An “all-at-once” policy requires an overall
report (e.g., an annual or an overview report). Both policies use people’s self-reports to
determine their pay, and both allow people to inflate their reports to get higher incentives,
that is, to cheat. Objectively, people can cheat to the same extent under both reporting
policies. However, the two policies differ in that the segmented one-by-one policy signals
closer monitoring than the all-at-once policy. We suggest here that lie aversion may have
a paradoxical effect on closer monitoring and lead people to cheat more. Specifically,
reporting a series of segmented units of performance (allowing small lies) should lead to
more cheating than a one-shot report of overall performance (that require one larger
lie). Two surveys indicated that while people perceive the all-at-once policy as more
trusting, they still expected people would be equally likely to cheat in both policies. An
experiment tested the effects of the two reporting policies on cheating. The findings
showed that contrary to the participants’ intuition, but in line with research on lie aversion,
the one-by-one policy resulted in more cheating than the all-at-once policy. Implications
for future research and organization policy are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Honesty and trust are cornerstones of organizational success. For instance, Watson Wyatt’s Work
USA 2002 survey indicated the 3-year total return to shareholders was almost three times higher
in companies characterized by high levels of honesty and trust than in companies characterized by
low levels of honesty and trust. Decades of organizational research back up this example, teaching
us that honesty and trust are important to both employers and employees (McGregor, 1960; Jones,
1991; Murphy, 1993; Moore and Gino, 2015). Honesty and trust are associated with higher levels
of cooperation, better performance, proactive actions, effective management, and organizational
growth (e.g., Jones and George, 1998; De Cremer et al., 2001; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Tyler, 2003;
Cook et al., 2005). In addition, research suggests that ethical behavior elicits intrinsic incentives
such as satisfaction and a sense of self-dignity (Peer et al., 2014; Moore and Gino, 2015).
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Clearly, maintaining high ethical standards and fostering trust
is advantageous for organizations. However, the combination
of honesty and trust is easier preached than achieved. In fact,
research suggests a counter-productive tradeoff exists between
the two constructs. Specifically, close monitoring and increased
enforcement are effective means to increase honesty, but are
considered detrimental to trust (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al.,
2008). Lowering the levels of monitoringmay boost trust, but—as
rational economic analysis and behavioral research show—such
leniency frequently leads to a gradual deterioration of ethical
standards and an increase in dishonest behavior (Becker, 1974;
Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008; Gino and Bazerman, 2009).
Thus, designing an organizational environment that encourages
both honest behavior and trust is a challenge, and choosing
optimal policies is not straightforward.
A common organizational solution lets employees monitor
and report their own performance. Taking self-reports at face
value, organizations signal that they trust their employees
and expect honest reports of true performance in return. An
optimistic view suggests that trusting policies can foster loyalty,
increase productivity, boost satisfaction, and reduce turnover
(e.g., Shockley-Zalabak et al., 2000; Parker et al., 2006). A more
pessimistic take is that self-report policies may tempt employees
to inflate their performance levels and cheat at the expense of the
organization.
Specific reporting procedures and especially the resolution
level of self-reports, reflect these different takes on self-reported
performance. Some organizations require regular segmented
reports (e.g., hours worked, number of items produced, quality
control measures; here dubbed the “one-by-one policy”). Other
organizations require overall reports (e.g., summarizing a work
project, expense reimbursements; here dubbed the “all-at-once”
policy). By its nature, the micro-management approach of
the one-by-one policy provides a higher level of monitoring
compared to the relatively moremacro-management approach of
the all-at-once policy. In the current work, we compare the two
reporting policies, and examine whether the difference between
the policies is merely a semantic nuance, or whether it leads to
different responses and affects the level of honesty.
Objectively, people can exploit both policies to the same
extent. For example, consider a company representative
reporting the number of customers that were interested in a
new service he offered. Suppose that on 5 consecutive days,
the numbers of interested customers were 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The
representative can inflate daily reports of performance (e.g.,
reporting 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) or inflate an overall report (e.g., report
20 instead of 15). Thus, from a rational economic analysis the
two policies should lead to similar levels of cheating. However,
Research on lie aversion shows that people justify small lies
more easily than big lies. To avoid the adversity of being “real”
liars, people tend to restrict their own dishonesty to a level
they can justify (e.g., Ayal et al., 2015; Shalvi et al., 2015). Thus,
rather than cheating to the maximal extent (for maximal profit),
people tend to cheat “only by a little” to benefit from cheating
but still maintain a sense of morality (Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi
et al., 2011a). Empirical evidence indicates that even when
participants are guaranteed they will not be caught, punished, or
even identified as cheaters, they still exhibit lie aversion (Gneezy,
2005; Lundquist et al., 2009; Shalvi et al., 2011b; Hilbig and
Hessler, 2013; Weisel and Shalvi, 2015). Applying the reasoning
of lie aversion to the abovementioned hypothetical example
suggests the company’s representative will feel more comfortable
telling five small lies than one big lie. Accordingly, people will
cheat more when they submit a series of small reports in the
one-by-one policy, and will restrain themselves when they
submit a single overall report in the all-at-once policy. This is the
possibility we test here.
Interestingly, there are two ways in which the mean level of
cheating can be higher in the one-by-one compared to the all-in-
once setting. One option is that more people may be tempted to
lie just a bit in the one-by-one setting compared to the all-at-once
setting. If this is true, we should observe that the distribution of
reported performance in the one-by-one distribution is shifted
to the right indicating more people reported higher outcomes.
A second option is that a similar proportion of people will lie
in both settings, but lies will be larger in the one-by-one policy.
The latter option bears a resemblance to the “what-the hell”
effect—that is, once people cave to lying, they lie by a lot (Mazar
et al., 2008; Mead et al., 2009; Ariely, 2012). We test these two
possibilities.
A recent paper provides initial support for our argument
that a one-by-one setting should lead to more lying than an
all-at-once setting. In this work, Schurr et al. (2012) examined
the effect of different choice procedures on dishonesty. In one
of their experiments participants played a 20-questions trivia
game. However, instead of answering the questions, participants
were first shown the correct answer and then asked to report
whether that was the answer they had in mind. Participants
earned money every time they reported they had the correct
answer in mind. Obviously, participants could lie to earn more
money, and the experimenters had no way to detect lies or
liars. Importantly, participants earned more money for difficult
questions [e.g., Samuel Langhorne Clemens is better known as:
(a) Rudyard Kipling; (b) Edgar Allan Poe; (c) Mark Twain;
(d) Oscar Wilde] and less money for easy questions [e.g., “The
Portrait of Dorian Gray” is a novel by: (a) Rudyard Kipling;
(b) Edgar Allan Poe; (c) Mark Twain; or (d) Oscar Wilde].
In one condition, participants were asked to choose between
an easy and a difficult question before each trial. In another
condition, participants decided ahead of time on the number
of easy and difficult questions they wanted to solve in 20 trials.
When facing a sequence of 20 temptations to cheat (as compared
to a single temptation), participants caved in and chose more
difficult (i.e., profitable) questions, to which they frequently
reported they had the correct answer in mind. Note, however,
that in both conditions, the task was identical (answering a
sequence of trivia questions). Thus, rather than comparing the
effect of reporting policies, this study primarily examined the
effect of one planned choice vs. repeated ongoing choices on
ethicality.
We now turn to report two surveys and an experiment that
aimed to answer the question: Which reporting policy is more
effective in encouraging honest self-reports—the one-by-one or
the all-at-once?
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The surveys tested people’s intuitions regarding the two
reporting policies. Participants of the first survey thought that the
macro-management all-at-once reporting policy conveys more
trust from the organization than the micro-management one-
by-one policy. Independent of that trust, other participants
completing the second survey expected the levels of dishonesty
employees will engage in should be the same for the two
reporting policies. That is, whereas people perceived the
all-at-once policy to demonstrate higher level of trust in
employees from the organization’s perspective, this trust does
not translates to people’s prediction regarding employees’
likelihood to behave unethically. Next, we report an experiment
providing a direct comparison between the one-by-one and
all-at-once reporting policies. The experimental task simulated
employees self-reporting their performance to their employer
for payment. The experimental findings indicate the one-by-
one policy led to more cheating than the all-at-once policy.
Implications for future research and for organization policy
are discussed.
PEOPLE’S INTUITIONS
As a first step, we assessed the extent to which people have a clear
and consensual intuitions regarding the one-by-one and all-at-
once reporting policies. This is important as policies are designed
based on what people believe the state of the world is. In the first
survey, we asked a group of participants which of the two policies
conveys more trust in employees’ honesty. In a second survey
we employed we asked a different group of participants whether
employees are more likely to cheat in one of the two policies.
Intuition Regarding Trust
Materials and Method
For this survey, we recruited 93 participants to complete a paid
online questionnaire via the Amazon Mechanical Turk website
(46 females,Mage = 36.18, SDage = 10.41).
The questionnaire described two fictional companies:
Company A utilizes a one-by-one reporting policy and requires
regular itemized reports of performance. Company B utilizes an
all-at-once reporting policy requiring an integrated overall report
of performance. Referring to five common types of performance
(working hours, travel expenses, overtime, work progress, and
calling in sick), we asked participants to state which of the two
companies is more likely to trust their employees to report
honestly. For example, the question regarding travel expenses
read: “Company A requires their employees to report each of
their travel expenses (food, hotels, taxis etc.) on separate forms.
Company B requires their employees to report all their travel
expenses (food, hotels, taxis, etc.) on just one form.” For each
question, participants chose one of three responses that read: “[1]
Employees in Company A are more trusted by the organization
to report honestly; [2] Employees in Company B are more
trusted by the organization to report honestly; [3] Employees in
Companies A and B are trusted to report honestly to the same
extent by their organizations.”
Results and Discussion
The relative frequencies distributions for each of the five
questions showed that most participants felt that the all-at-
once reporting policy (of Company B) conveys more trust than
the one-by-one reporting policy (of Company A). A pooled
distribution summarizes the general intuition (see Figure 1). A
small proportion of the participants (13%) thought that the one-
by-one policy of company A reflect more trust in the employees,
a small proportion of participants (15%) thought both policies
reflect the same level of trust, and the vast majority of the
participants (72%) stated that the all-at-once reporting policy
reflectsmore trust in the employees.We used effect coding (−1 =
trust is more likely in Company A; 0 = trust is equally likely
in both companies; 1 = trust is more likely in Company B). In
line with the frequency distribution, the average of the pooled
responses was significantly greater than zero (M = 0.59, SD =
0.71) t(92) = 8.02 p < 0.0001.
Intuition Regarding Cheating
Materials and Methods
For a second survey, we recruited an additional 102 participants
to complete a paid online questionnaire via the Amazon
Mechanical Turk website (51 females, Mage = 35.17,
SDage =11.91).
The survey was identical to the one described above, but this
time we asked participants to state in which of the two companies
employees are more likely to inflate self-reports. Participants
chose one of three responses that read: “[1] Employees in
Company A are more likely to inflate their reports; [2] Employees
in Company B are more likely to inflate their reports; [3]
Employees in Companies A and B are as likely to inflate their
reports.”
Results and Discussion
The relative frequencies distributions for each of the five
questions showed that most participants expected inflated self-
reports to be equally likely whether the reporting policy was
one-by-one (i.e., Company A) or all-at-once (i.e., Company B).
A pooled distribution summarizes the general intuition (see
Figure 2). A small proportion of the participants (13%) predicted
FIGURE 1 | Relative frequencies of participants’ ascribed
organizational trust in employees per company.
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FIGURE 2 | Relative frequencies of participants’ intuitions regarding
the effect of reporting policy on inflated self-reports in the workplace.
that the one-by-one policy of company A would lead to more
cheating, a small proportion of participants (10%) thought the
all-at-once policy would lead to more cheating, and the vast
majority of the participants (77%) stated that the reporting policy
would not influence the rate of inflated self-reports. We used
effect coding (−1 = cheating is more likely in Company A; 0 =
cheating is equally likely in both companies; 1= cheating is more
likely in Company B). In line with the frequency distribution, the
average of the pooled responses was practically zero (M = 0.03,
SD = 0.47) t(101) = 0.62 p = 0.534.
Thus, whereas participants perceived the macro-management
all-at-once policy as more trusting than the micro-management
one-by-one policy, this intuition did not translate to assuming
that people will lie more in the one-by-one policy.We next report
an experiment that compared the effect of the two reporting
policies on actual cheating behavior in a controlled laboratory
experiment.
EXPERIMENT
The experiment reported below provides a direct comparison
of the one-by-one and all-at-once reporting policies. The
experiment was designed to test if the different procedures of the
one-by-one and all-at-once reporting policies affect the level of
dishonesty.
Eliciting Cheating with a Trivia Game
To simulate a work setting and allow participants to earn money
solely on the basis of self-reports, we adapted the trivia game
paradigm (Schurr et al., 2012). The game included two rounds
of 20 questions each1. The first round was entitled “practice”
and did not involve incentives. The second round was entitled
“test” and involved incentives. In the “test” round, participants
earned a fixed payment each time they stated they had the correct
answer in mind. Note that performance level could not improve
between the two rounds (i.e., trivia games are based on existing
1We selected 40 trivia questions for the practice and test rounds from a pool of
200 questions that were pretested. The level of difficulty was controlled and was
comparable within and between rounds.
knowledge and each question was presented only once). Thus, the
practice round served to establish baseline performance,2 and any
improvement in the test round represented participants’ inflating
performance to earn more money. To simulate the two reporting
policies, in the one-by-one condition, we presented participants
with a series of 20 separate trials. In each trial, participants
answered a single trivia question. In the all-at-once condition,
we presented participants with a list of 20 trivia questions in a
single trial. Participants solved all the 20 trivia questions in this
one trial and submitted a 20-line report of their performance (see
Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material).
Materials and Methods
We recruited 96 participants (43 females,Mage = 23.53, SDage =
4.89) via an online web system to participate in an experiment at
the Cologne Laboratory of Economic Research. We compensated
participants with a fixed show-up fee of e5 and an added bonus
contingent on their earnings in the test round of the trivia task
(e0–e4). The experiment lasted about 30min.
Upon arrival, participants were seated in computer cubicles
that ensured privacy and were randomly allocated to one of the
two reporting-policy conditions. In the one-by-one condition, in
each trial, a single question was displayed on screen. Participants
were asked to think about the answer, keep it in mind, and click
a button to reveal the correct one. Participants then clicked a
Yes/No button to report whether the answer they had in mind
was correct. Participants repeated the same procedure for each
of the 20 questions (see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material).
In the all-at-once condition, a list of all 20 questions appeared
on the screen. Participants worked through the list (in any
order they saw fit). For each question, participants were asked
to think about the answer, click a button to reveal the correct
one, and then click the Yes/No button to report whether they
had the correct answer in mind. Participants could edit and
change their responses before they submitted their overall reports
(see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material). In each condition,
participants first completed a practice round (without incentives)
and then completed a test round (with incentives). In the test
round, participants earnede0.2 each time they reported they had
the correct answer in mind.
Results and Discussion
The critical measure was the difference in reported performance
between the test and practice rounds. As explained above,
any improvement from the baseline performance represented
cheating for monetary profit.
The findings showed that in both conditions, participants
tended to inflate their performance in the test round to earn
money. Importantly, participants were much more likely to
inflate their performance reports in the one-by-one condition
2One reason to inflate performance has to do with impression management and
social desirability, in that no one wants to admit ignorance. Thus, the baseline
performance that participants report in the practice round reflects a composite
of their true performance and self-enhancement. The incentives in the test round
present an additional temptation to cheat—this time for monetary profit. Thus,
any “improvement” in the second round isolates the component of dishonesty that
is harnessed to increase monetary profit.
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(improving by 10.74%) than in the all-at-once condition
(improving by 3.6%, see Table 1).
We submitted the overall performance reports in the practice
and test rounds to a repeated measures ANOVA with reporting
policy as a between-subject variable. The effect of Round was
significant F(1, 94) = 16.96, p < 0.0001 partial η
2
= 0.15. The
main effect of Policy was not significant F(1, 94) < 0, ns. The
interaction between Round and Policy was marginally significant
F(1, 94) = 3.91, p = 0.051, partial η
2
= 0.04 indicating that in
general participants tended to inflate performance more in the
one-by-one condition than in the all-at-once condition. Simple
effects analysis revealed significant improvement (compared to
the null hypothesis that assumes no improvement) in the one-by-
one [t(46) = 3.95, p < 0.0001] but not in the all-at-once setting
[t(48) = 1.67, p = 0.105].
We further tested the effect using non-parametric tests. The
baseline performance in the practice round differed slightly
between the two experimental conditions, but the difference was
not significant (Z = 1.02, p = 0.307, Mann-Whitney U-
test). Participants’ self-reports indicated improved (i.e., inflated)
performance in the test round. A Wilcoxon signed rank test
showed that this improvement was significant in the one-by-one
condition (Z = 3.473, p = 0.0005), but was not significant
in the all-at-once condition (Z = 1.51, p = 0.130). A direct
comparison between the two experimental conditions indicated
that improvement (i.e., inflated performance) was almost three
times larger in the one-by-one condition than in the all-at-once
condition (Z = 2.14, p = 0.032, Mann-Whitney U-test).
Thus, in line with lie aversion, the findings showed that the
one-by-one policy led to more cheating, whereas the all-at-once
policy resulted in considerable self-restraint.
In a follow up analysis we examined behavior at the individual
level.Whereas, our design does not allow to determine if a certain
participant lied or not, the “improvement” that a participant
reports allows us to assess the likelihood of dishonesty.
Specifically, in the Trivia paradigm, if a participant reports the
same level of performance in the practice and test rounds, there
is high likelihood of honesty. Negative improvement scores (i.e.,
lower performance in the test round compared to practice)
suggest that honesty was chosen over the possibility to earn
money (and at the personal cost of admitting ignorance). In
contrast, reporting better performance in the test round, suggests
it is likely that performance was falsely inflated to earn more
money.
TABLE 1 | Self-reported performance on the trivia game.
N Average correct answers reported “Improvement”
(% female) average
differencePractice phase Test phase
One- 47 14.06 15.57 1.51*
by-one (53%) (SD = 2.62)
All-at- 49 14.65 15.18 0.53
once (41%) (SD = 2.22)
*The mean difference was significantly different from zero at the p < 0.01 level on the
two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test.
Figure 3 shows the relative frequency distributions of
“improvement” scores in the two experimental conditions. As
can be seen, negative to zero improvement scores (i.e., high
likelihood of honesty) were more frequent in the all-at-once
reporting policy. In contrast, high improvement scores (i.e.,
high likelihood of dishonesty) were more than twice as likely
in the one-by-one policy. The difference between the frequency
distributions was marginally significant χ2
(4)
= 8.81, p = 0.066.
The pattern lends further support to the idea that one-by-one
reporting policy is more likely to facilitate dishonesty than all-
at-once reporting policy.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Self-reporting policies aim to apply organizational monitoring
and encourage trust at the same time. Here, we compared
two specific reporting policies. One policy, entitled one-
by-one, requires employees to report separate segments of
their performance. Another policy, entitled all-at-once, allows
employees to submit an integrated overall report. Objectively,
employees could exploit both policies and inflate self-reports to
the same extent. Indeed, two surveys revealed that while people
perceive the all-at-once policy asmore trusting, they still expected
people would be equally likely to cheat in both policies. Our
results demonstrate however that people lie more in a one-by-one
procedure than in an all-at-once procedure.
An analysis at the individual level indicated that participants
were more likely to resist temptation and be honest when they
were asked to provide a single report of their performance. In
contrast, participants were more likely to inflate performance
to a large extent when they provided a sequence of segmented
reports. The finding is in line with the idea that repeated reports
in the one-by-one policy make it harder for people to resist the
temptation to cheat, and that once they cave in to the temptation
to lie, they lie by a lot.
FIGURE 3 | Frequency distributions of participants’ “improvement”
scores in the one-by-one and all-at-once reporting policies.
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As always, generalization of experimental findings should
be cautious, and subject to the accumulation of research that
offers replications of the effect as well as identifying boundary
conditions. For example, Desai and Kouchaki (2015) recently
reported a study that seemed to favor the one-by-one policy
over the all-at-once policy. In this study, an experimenter
contacted garage mechanics to obtain an estimate for changing
the brake pads of a car. The findings showed that in this set-
up, mechanics inflated costs less when they provided separate
estimates for two different aspects of the job (i.e., parts, labor),
than when they provided an overall cost estimate. The authors
offered that specific estimates elicited higher accountability
requiring mechanics to be able to justify their quotes (Desai
and Kouchaki, 2015, study 7). It is difficult to establish a
direct comparison between offering a price quote to a client
and reporting performance to an employer. Still, the finding
raises an interesting question regarding a potential difference
between one-time task and repeated tasks. For example, what
would have happened, if the mechanics had to provide price
quotes repeatedly to more clients? Would the segmented
quote still be lower than the overall quote for the 10th and
20th clients? This question sets an interesting direction for
future research.
On a theoretical level, one-by-one and all-at-once reporting
procedures can be used to test possible interactions between
accountability (e.g., Tetlock, 1992; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999;
Desai and Kouchaki, 2015) and lie aversion (e.g., Gneezy, 2005;
Lundquist et al., 2009; Shalvi et al., 2011b; Hilbig and Hessler,
2013). The two constructs could probably be combined to work
in the same direction and encourage honesty. In the setting
we examined, however, we suspect that accountability and lie
aversion may have operated against each other. To wit, the one-
by-one itemized report may have elicited a sense of accountability
and increased the need to justify one’s actions. Note however,
that in our experiment, such reporting procedure involved small
lies that disappeared from the screen at the end of each trial.
The combination of an increased need to justify one’s action and
small lies that are easily forgotten may have led to a paradoxical
outcome that minimized the psychological cost of guilt and
facilitated cheating. More research is needed to examine and
fully establish the ways in which lie aversion and accountability
interact, as well as the contextual factors that may determine their
joint effect.
It is worth noting that the experimental task we employed
provides only direct measures of self-reported improvement
rather than explicit measures of cheating. While we assume
that improvement in the trivia tasks points at high likelihood
of cheating—it is of course possible that some participants
indeed improved in their performance levels in the test round.
We chose this experimental task because it has high external
validity (as people often do not know if a person is cheating
or not, just receive indirect indications for such possibility).
Future researchmay benefit from experimental tasks that allow to
trace individual’s dishonesty more directly. Such future work can
further explore if individual differences in relevant parameters
such as gender, moral disengagement, or moral identity, may
moderate any of the observed effects. This would increase our
understanding of the patterns identified here.
On an applied note, the findings are also important for
the development of organizational monitoring policies that aim
to prompt both honesty and trust. Indeed, in a survey we
found that people consider organizations implementing an all-
at-once policy to be more trusting of their employees’ honesty
than organizations implementing the one-by-one policy. Our
experiment suggests that close monitoring policy might lead
people to discount segmented transgressions as minor and
negligible and thus result in lower honesty levels. Our findings
offer an optimistic view showing that the more trusting policy led
to more honest behavior.
Many organizational activities can be categorized as one-by-
one or all-at-once tasks. For example, many people sort out
their incoming emails by automatically placing them in multiple
folders, which in turn get packed with many items waiting to be
dealt with. Does the number of folders affect people’s responses
to those emails? People also use reporting systems to report
different purchase orders, submit expenses reports, tax reports,
and so forth. Our findings suggest that the effect of reporting
procedure on honesty is not trivial and policy makers should
consider carefully the reporting procedures and even the display
format of reporting systems to design settings that encourage
ethical conduct.
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